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Abstract
The security of quantum key distribution protocols is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However,
a precise analysis of the security properties requires tools from both classical cryptography and information theory.
Here, we employ recent results in non-asymptotic classical information theory to show that one-way information
reconciliation imposes fundamental limitations on the amount of secret key that can be extracted in the finite
key regime. In particular, we find that an often used approximation for the information leakage during information
reconciliation is not generally valid. We propose an improved approximation that takes into account finite key effects
and numerically test it against codes for two probability distributions, that we call binary-binary and binary-Gaussian,
that typically appear in quantum key distribution protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [4], [10] is a prime example of the interdisciplinary nature of quantum
cryptography and the first application of quantum science that has matured into the realm of engineering and
commercial development. While the security of the generated key is intuitively guaranteed by the laws of quantum
mechanics, a precise analysis of the security requires tools from both classical cryptography and information theory
(see [27], [36] for early security proofs, and see [34] for a comprehensive review). This is particularly relevant
when investigating the security of QKD in a practical setting where the resources available to the honest parties
are finite and the security analysis consequently relies on non-asymptotic information theory.
In the following, we consider QKD protocols between two honest parties, Alice and Bob, which can be partitioned
into the following rough steps. In the quantum phase, N physical systems are prepared, exchanged and measured
by Alice and Bob. In the parameter estimation (PE) phase, relevant parameters describing the channel between
Alice and Bob are estimated from correlations measured in the quantum phase. If the estimated parameters do
not allow extraction of a secure key, the protocol aborts at this point. Otherwise, the remaining measurement
data is condensed into two highly correlated bit strings of length n in the sifting phase—the raw keys Xn for
Alice and Y n for Bob [31]. We call n the block length and it is the quantity that is usually limited by practical
considerations (time interval between generated keys, amount of key that has to be discarded in case Alice and Bob
create different keys, hardware restrictions). In the information reconciliation (IR) phase, Alice and Bob exchange
classical information about Xn over a public channel in order for Bob to compute an estimate Xˆn of Xn. The
confirmation (CO) phase ensures that Xˆn = Xn holds with high probability, or it aborts the protocol. Finally, in
the privacy amplification (PA) phase, Alice and Bob distill a shared secret key of ℓ bits from Xn and Xˆn. We say
that a protocol is secure if (up to some error tolerance) both Alice and Bob hold an identical, uniform key that is
independent of the information gathered by an eavesdropper during the protocol, for any eavesdropper with access
to the quantum and the authenticated classical channel.
The ratio ℓ/N is constrained by the following effects: 1) Some measurement results are published for PE and
subsequently discarded. 2) The sifting phase removes data that is not expected to be highly correlated, thus further
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2reducing the length n of the raw key. 3) Additional information about the raw keys is leaked to the eavesdropper
during the IR and CO phase. 4) To remove correlations with the eavesdropper, Xn and Xˆn need to be purged in
the PA phase, resulting in a shorter key.
Some of these contributions vanish asymptotically for large N while others approach fundamental limits. 1
Modern tools allow to analyze QKD protocols that are secure against the most general attacks. They provide
lower bounds on the number of secure key bits that can be extracted for a fixed block length, n. For the BB84
protocol, such proofs are for example given in [35], [33] and [14]. These proofs were subsequently simplified to
achieve better key rates in [43] and [17], respectively. (See also [42] for a recent detailed proof.) All results have
in common that the key rate that can be achieved with finite resources is strictly smaller than the asymptotic limit
for large n—as one would intuitively expect.
We are concerned with a complementary question: Given a secure but otherwise arbitrary QKD protocol for a
fixed n, are there fundamental upper bounds on the length of the key that can be produced by this protocol? Such
bounds are of theoretical as well as practical interest since they provide a benchmark against which contemporary
implementations of QKD can be measured. In the asymptotic regime of large block lengths, such upper bounds
have already been investigated, for example in [29]. Here we limit the discussion to IR and focus on bounds that
solely arise due to finite block lengths (Sec. II). We complement the bounds with a numerical study of achievable
leak values with LDPC codes (Sec. V), and study some possible improvements and open issues (Sec. VI).
II. FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS FOR ONE-WAY RECONCILIATION
We consider one-way IR protocols, where Alice first computes a syndrome,M ∈ M, from her raw key, Xn, and
sends it to Bob who uses the syndrome together with his own raw key, Y n, to construct an estimate Xˆn of Xn.
We will assume that X takes values in a discrete alphabet while we allow Y to take values in the real line. We are
interested in the size of the syndrome (in bits), denoted log |M|, and the probability of error, Pr[Xn 6= Xˆn]. In
most contemporary security proofs log |M| enters the calculation of the key rate rather directly. 2 More precisely,
to achieve security it is necessary (but not sufficient) that
ℓ ≤ n− leakEC , (1)
where leakEC is the amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper during IR. Since it is usually impossible
to determine leakEC precisely, this term is often bounded as leakEC ≤ log |M|. In the following, we are thus
interested in finding lower bounds on log |M|.
Let fXY be a probability density function. We say that an IR protocol is ε-correct on fXY if it satisfies Pr[X
n 6=
Xˆn] ≤ ε whenXn and Y n are distributed according to (fXY )×n. Any such protocol (under weak conditions on fXY
and for small ε) satisfies 1
n
log |M| ≥ H(X|Y )f [40]. Moreover, equality can be achieved for n→∞ [37]. On first
sight, it thus appears reasonable to compare the performance of a finite block length protocol by comparing log |M|
with its asymptotic limit. In fact, for the purpose of numerical simulations, the amount of one-way communication
from Alice to Bob required to perform IR is usually approximated as leakEC ≈ ξ ·nH(X|Y )f , where ξ > 1 is the
reconciliation efficiency. The constant ξ is often chosen in the range ξ = 1.05 to ξ = 1.2. However, this choice is
scarcely motivated and independent of the block length, the bit error rate and the required correctness considered.
Here, we argue that this approximation is unnecessarily rough in light of recent progress in non-asymptotic
information theory. Strassen [38] already observed in the context of noisy channel coding that the asymptotic
expansion of the fundamental limit for large n admits a Gaussian approximation. This approximation was recently
refined by Polyanskiy et al. [32] (see also [16]). The problem of information reconciliation—also called source
compression with side information—was investigated by Hayashi [15] and recently by Tan and Kosut [40]. Here
we go slightly beyond this and provide bounds on the asymptotic expansion up to third order:
Theorem 1. Let 0 < ε <1 and fXY arbitrary. Then, for large n, any ε-correct IR protocol on fXY satisfies
log |M| ≥ nH(X|Y ) +
√
nV (X|Y ) Φ−1(1− ε)− 1
2
log n−O(1) .
1Consider, for example, BB84 with asymmetric basis choice [25] on a channel with quantum bit error rate Q. There, contributions 1) and
2) vanish asymptotically while contributions 3) and 4) converge to h(Q).
2Recent works analyzing the finite block length behavior using this approximation include [35], [7], [43], [17], [5], [1], [24].
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Fig. 1. The solid lines show the fundamental limit of the efficiency for the binary-binary distribution, ξ(n, ε;Q), as a function of n for
different values of Q and ε. The dotted lines show fits (see Table I) to Eq. (21) for simulated LDPC codes (marked with symbols).
Furthermore, there exists an ε-correct IR protocol with
log |M| ≤ nH(X|Y ) +
√
nV (X|Y )Φ−1(1− ε) + 1
2
log n+O(1),
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution,
H(X|Y ) := E
[
− log fXY
fY
]
(2)
is the conditional entropy and
V (X|Y ) := Var
[
− log fXY
fY
]
(3)
is the conditional entropy variance.
The proof uses standard techniques, namely Yassaee et al.’s achievability bounds [50] and an analogue of the
meta-converse [32]. Note that the gap of log n between achievable and converse bounds for general distributions
leaves room for improvements. In channel coding, the gap is at most 12 log n, and constant for certain channels
(see, e.g., [45], [2], [39] for recent work on this topic).
We are in particular interested in two situations that typically appear in QKD.
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Fig. 2. As in Fig. 1 the solid lines show the fundamental limit of the efficiency but for the binary-Gaussian distribution, ξ(n, ε;σ), as a
function of n for different signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) and ε values.
A. Binary Variable QKD
We first look at binary variable protocols, such as BB84 [4] or the 6-state protocol [6], in the absence of an active
eavesdropper. In this situation, the raw keys X and Y result from measurements on a channel with independent
quantum bit error rate Q. The distribution (PQXY )
n, that we call the binary-binary distribution, describes a typical
manifestation of two random strings for which the expected bit error rate is Q. Here, we (at least) require ε-
correctness for the distribution
PQXY (0, 0) = P
Q
XY (1, 1) =
1−Q
2
, and
PQXY (0, 1) = P
Q
XY (1, 0) =
Q
2
. (4)
We show the following, specialized bounds:
Corollary 2. Let 0 < ε < 1 and let 0 < Q < 12 . Then, for large n, any ε-correct IR protocol satisfies
log |M| ≥ ξ(n, ε;Q) · nh(Q)− 1
2
log n−O(1), (5)
where
ξ(n, ε;Q) := 1 +
1√
n
√
v(Q)
h(Q)
Φ−1(1−ε).
Here, h(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) and v(x) = x(1− x) log2 (x/(1− x)). Furthermore, there exists an
ε-correct IR protocol with log |M| ≤ ξ(n, ε;Q) · nh(Q) + 12 log n+O(1).
The proof of Eq. (5) follows by specializing Theorem 1 to the distribution PQXY .
Moreover, numerical simulations reveal that the approximation in Corollary 2 is very accurate even for small
values of n. More precisely, we find the following exact bound:
log |M| ≥ nh(Q) +
(
n(1−Q)− F−1
(
ε
(
1 + 1/
√
n
)
;n, 1−Q
)
− 1
)
log
1−Q
Q
− 1
2
log n− log 1
ε
, (6)
where F−1( · ;n, p) is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution. This bound
can be evaluated numerically even for reasonably large n.
5B. Continuous Variable QKD
The second joint distribution of interest is the binary-Gaussian distribution:
fXY (x, y) =
1
2
√
2πσ2
exp
(
−(x− y)
2
2σ2
)
(7)
where x ∈ {−1, 1} and y ∈ R.
In the absence of an active eavesdropper, this distribution arises in continuous variable QKD (CVQKD) with
binary modulations [22], [23] and can be induced in the classical postprocessing of CVQKD with Gaussian
modulation [21], [19]. For this distribution, both the conditional entropy and the conditional entropy variance
do not have known closed form formulas. Abusing notation we denote them again by h(σ) and v(σ) respectively.
The conditional entropy is known to be [20]:
h(σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
φσ(y) log(φσ(y))dy +
1
2
log(8πeσ2) (8)
where
φσ(y) =
1√
8πσ2
(
e−
(y+1)2
2σ2 + e−
(y−1)2
2σ2
)
The conditional entropy variance is easily found by applying Eq. (3)
v(σ) = e(σ)− h(σ)2 (9)
where
e(σ) = 2
∫ ∞
−∞
fXY (1, y)
(
log
(
fXY (1, y)
fXY (1, y) + fXY (−1, y)
))2
These two integral forms can be solved numerically.
For this distribution, Theorem 1 yields the following bound:3
Corollary 3. Let 0 < ε < 1 and let σ > 0. Then, for large n, any ε-correct IR protocol satisfies
log |M | ≥ ξ(n, ε;σ) · nh(σ)− 1
2
log n−O(1), (10)
where
ξ(n, ε;σ) := 1 +
1√
n
√
v(σ)
h(σ)
Φ−1(1−ε).
Furthermore, there exists an ε-correct IR protocol with log |M| ≤ ξ(n, ε;σ) · nh(σ) + 12 log n+O(1).
III. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
For a finite alphabet X , we use P(X ) to denote the set of probability distributions on X . When X is the
real line P(X ) denotes the set of distributions on the Borel sets of the reals. A channel is a probabilistic kernel
W : X → P(Y) and we use PW ∈ P(Y) to denote the output distribution resulting from applyingW to P ∈ P(X ).
We employ the ε-hypothesis testing divergence as defined in [9], [45]. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) and let P,Q ∈ P(Z). We
consider binary (probabilistic) hypothesis tests ξ : Z → [0, 1] and define the ε-hypothesis testing divergence
Dεh(P‖Q) := sup
{
R ∈ R
∣∣∣ ∃ ξ : EQ [ξ(Z)] ≤ (1− ε)e−R ∧ EP [ξ(Z)] ≥ 1− ε}.
Note that Dεh(P‖Q) = − log β1−ε(P,Q)1−ε where βα is defined in Polyanskiy et al. [32]. It satisfies a data-processing
inequality [49]
Dεh(P‖Q) ≥ Dεh(PW‖QW )
for all channels W from X to Y .
3We here apply Theorem 1 to distributions that are continuous in Y . Note that the proofs leading to Theorem 1 can easily be generalized
to this setting.
6The following quantity, which characterizes the distribution of the log-likelihood ratio and is known as the
divergence spectrum [13], is sometimes easier to manipulate and evaluate.
Dεs(P‖Q) := sup
{
R ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ PrP
[
log
P
Q
≤ R
]
≤ ε
}
.
It is intimately related to the ε-hypothesis testing divergence. For any δ ∈ (0, 1 − ε), we have [45], [41]
Dεs(P‖Q)− log
1
1− ε ≤ D
ε
h(P‖Q) ≤ Dε+δs (P‖Q) + log
1− ε
δ
. (11)
For a joint probability distribution PXY ∈ P(X × Y), we define the Shannon conditional entropy
H(X|Y )P := E
[
− log PXY (X,Y )
PY (Y )
]
=
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
PXY (x, y)
(
− log PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
)
.
and its information variance
V (X|Y )P := Var
[
− log PXY (X,Y )
PY (Y )
]
=
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
PXY (x, y)
(
− log PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
−H(X|Y )P
)2
.
We also employ the min-entropy, which is defined as
Hmin(X|Y )P := − log pguess(X|Y )P ,
where pguess(X|Y )P :=
∑
y∈Y maxx∈X PXY (x, y).
IV. PROOFS
A. One-Shot Converse Bound for General Codes
A general (probabilistic) one-way IR code for a finite alphabet X is a tuple {M, e, d} consisting of a set of
syndromes, M, an encoding channel e : X → P(M), and a decoding channel d : Y ×M → P(X ). We say that
a code is ε-correct on a joint distribution PXY ∈ P(X × Y) if
Pr
PXY
[
X = d(Y, e(X))
] ≥ 1− ε.
The converse for probabilistic protocols clearly implies the converse for protocols where the encoder and decoder
are deterministic as a special case.
We show the following one-shot lower bound on the size of the syndrome.
Proposition 4. Any ε-correct one-way IR code for PXY satisfies,
log |M| ≥ Hmin(X|Y )Q −Dε+δs
(
PXY
∥∥QXY ) + log δ,
for any δ ∈ (0, 1 − ε) and any QXY ∈ P(X × Y).
Proof. Let P
XYMXˆ
be the distribution induced by PXY , M ← e(X) and Xˆ ← d(Y,M). Analogously, QXYMXˆ
is induced by QXY ∈ P(X ×Y), which we fix for the remainder. We then consider the hypothesis test ξ(X, Xˆ) =
1{X = Xˆ} between P
XXˆ
and Q
XXˆ
. We find
EP [ξ(X, Xˆ)] = Pr
P
[X = Xˆ ] ≥ 1− ε
and
EQ[ξ(X, Xˆ)] = Pr
Q
[X = Xˆ] ≤ |M| pguess(X|Y )Q.
The first inequality holds by assumption that the code is ε-correct. The second inequality follows from the fact
that Pr[X = Xˆ ] ≤ pguess(X|Y M) ≤ pguess(X|Y ) |M|.
7By definition of the ε-divergence and the min-entropy, we thus have
Dεh(PXXˆ‖QXXˆ) ≥ Hmin(X|Y )Q − log |M|+ log(1− ε). (12)
Furthermore, Eq. (11) and the data-processing inequality with d and e yields
Dε+δs (PXY ‖QXY ) + log
1− ε
δ
≥ Dεh(PXY ‖QXY )
≥ Dεh(PXYM‖QXYM )
≥ Dεh(PXXˆ‖QXXˆ).
Finally, the statement follows by substituting Eq. (12) and solving for log |M|.
In the i.i.d. setting, it is sufficient to consider distributions of the form QXY = UX × PY , where UX is the
uniform distribution on X . The bound in Prop. 4 then simplifies to
log |M| ≥ log |X | −Dε+δs
(
PXY
∥∥UX × PY ) + log δ. (13)
However, it is unclear whether choices of QXY that contain correlations between X and Y or are not uniform
on X are useful to derive tight bounds in the finite block length regime.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
The problem of information reconciliation, or source compression with side information has been studied by
many authors in classical information theory. Recent work by Hayashi [15] as well as Tan and Kosut [40] considers
the normal approximation of this problem. Here, in analogy with [45], we go one step further and also look at the
logarithmic third order term.
We consider the direct and converse parts of the theorem separately. Theorem 1 then follows as an immediate
corollary. We prove slightly more precise converse and direct theorems by considering the special case where the
information variance vanishes separately. Note that the bounds are tight in third order for this special case, whereas
otherwise a gap of log n remains.
Theorem 5 (Converse for IR). Let 0 < ε < 1 and let PXY be a probability distribution. Any ε-correct one-way
IR protocol on PXY satisfies the following bounds:
• If V (X|Y )P > 0, we have
log |M| ≥ nH(X|Y )P +
√
nV (X|Y )P Φ−1(1− ε)− 1
2
log n−O(1),
• If V (X|Y )P = 0, we have log |M| ≥ nH(X|Y )P + log(1− ε).
Proof. We consider an i.i.d. distribution (PXY )
×n and use Prop. 4, more precisely Eq. (13), to get
log |M| ≥ n log |X | −Dε+δs
(
(PXY )
×n∥∥(UX × PY )×n)+ log δ
= −n sup
{
R ∈ R
∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
PXY (Xi, Yi)
PY (Yi)
≤ R
]
≤ ε+ δ
}
+ log δ (14)
for any 0 < δ < 1 − ε. Note that we pulled log |X | into the information spectrum to find (14). Next, observe
that the random variables Zi = log
PXY (Xi,Yi)
PY (Yi)
follow an i.i.d. distribution, and satisfy E[Zi] = −H(X|Y )P and
Var[Zi] = V (X|Y )P . Let us first consider the special case where V (X|Y )P = 0. This implies directly that
Zi = −H(X|Y )P with probability 1. Thus,
Pr
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi ≤ R
]
=
{
0 if R < −H(X|Y )P
1 if R ≥ −H(X|Y )P
.
Hence, for any ξ > 0 and δ = 1− ε− ξ, we find log |M| ≥ nH(X|Y )P + log(1− ε− ξ), proving the result in
the limit ξ → 0.
8In the following, we may therefore assume that V (X|Y )P > 0, which allows for a simple application of the
Berry-Esseen theorem, which states that
∀R ∈ R :
∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi ≤ R
]
− Φ
(
√
n
R+H(X|Y )P√
V (X|Y )P
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ B√n ,
where
B := B0
T (X|Y )P(√
V (X|Y )P
)3
and B0 ≤ 12 is a the Berry-Esseen constant [46] and T (X|Y )P := E
[∣∣ log PY
PXY
−H(X|Y )P
∣∣3] < ∞ is the third
moment of the information spectrum. Since 0 < B <∞ is finite, we find
log |M| ≥ −n sup
{
R ∈ R
∣∣∣∣∣Φ
(
√
n
R+H(X|Y )P√
V (X|Y )P
)
≤ ε+ B + 1√
n
}
− 1
2
log n
= nH(X|Y )P
−
√
nV (X|Y )P · sup
{
r ∈ R
∣∣∣∣Φ(r) ≤ ε+ B + 1√n
}
− 1
2
log n
= nH(X|Y )P −
√
nV (X|Y )P Φ−1
(
ε+
B + 1√
n
)
− 1
2
log n .
Here, we chose δ = 1/
√
n, implicitly assuming that n > (B + 1)2(1 − ε)−2 is sufficiently large. Since Φ−1 is
continuously differentiable except at the boundaries, there exists a constant γ such that
Φ−1
(
ε+
B + 1√
n
)
≤ Φ−1(ε) + γ B + 1√
n
.
Since V (X|Y )P <∞, this then leads to the desired bound
log |M| ≥ nH(X|Y )P −
√
nV (X|Y )P Φ−1(ε)− 1
2
log n
− γ
(
B0
T (X|Y )P
V (X|Y )P +
√
V (X|Y )P
)
. (15)
The constant term in (15) can be simplified when ε < 12 and n > (B + 1)
2(12 − ε)−2. We get
log |M| ≥ nH(X|Y )P −
√
nV (X|Y )P Φ−1(ε)− 1
2
log n
− 1
ϕ(Φ−1(ε))
· 3T (X|Y )P
2V (X|Y )P ,
where we used that B0 ≤ 12 and
(√
V (X|Y )P
)3 ≤ T (X|Y )P . Moreover, we note that the choice γ = dΦ−1d ε ∣∣ε =
1
ϕ(Φ−1(ε)) is sufficient (and also necessary for large n) due to concavity of Φ
−1 on (0, 12). Here, ϕ(x) =
dΦ
dx
∣∣
x
=
1√
2π
exp
(− x2/2) denotes the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. The constant term
behaves very badly for small ε, e.g., we find
1
ϕ
(
Φ−1
(
10−4
)) ≈ 2.5 · 103
for a typical value of ε. Nonetheless, the normal approximation in Theorem 5 is often very accurate.
Theorem 6 (Achievability for IR). Let 0 < ε < 1 and let PXY be a probability distribution. There exists an
ε-correct one-way IR protocol with the following property:
• If V (X|Y )P > 0, we have
log |M| ≤ nH(X|Y )P +
√
nV (X|Y )P Φ−1(1− ε) + 1
2
log n+O(1).
9• If V (X|Y )P = 0, we have log |M| ≤ nH(X|Y )P − log ε.
Proof. We employ a one-shot achievability bound due to [50] (we use the variant in [3, Cor. 12]), which, for every
0 < δ < ε, ensures the existence of an ε-correct protocol with
log |M| ≤ n log |X | −Dε−δs
(
(PXY )
×n ∥∥ (UX × PY )×n)− log δ + 1.
The remaining steps are exactly analogous to the steps taken in the proof of the converse asymptotic expansion,
and we omit them here.
C. Proof of Corollary 2
The corollary is a trivial specialization of Theorem 1 and it only remains to evaluate H(X|Y )P and V (X|Y )P
for the distribution in Eq. (4). We find
H(X|Y )P = −
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) log
PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
= −Q logQ− (1−Q) log(1−Q) =: h(Q),
and
V (X|Y )P =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)
(
log
PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
+ h(Q)
)2
= Q
(
(1−Q) logQ− (1−Q) log(1−Q)
)2
+ (1−Q)
(
Q log(1−Q)−Q logQ
)2
=
(
Q(1−Q)2 + (1−Q)Q2)( logQ− log(1−Q))2
= Q(1−Q)
(
log
Q
1−Q
)2
=: v(Q).
D. Exact Converse Bound for (ε,Q)-correct Codes
Let us state a more precise lower bound on log |M| that is valid for all n and can be evaluated numerically
for large n. This bound has the advantage that it does not contain unspecified contributions of the form O(1). In
particular, it does not suffer from the problem of potentially large constant terms as discussed above.
Proposition 7. Let 0 < ε < 1 and let 0 < Q < 12 . Then, any (ε,Q)-correct one-way error correction code on a
block of length n satisfies
log |M| ≥ nh(Q)
+
(
n(1−Q)− F−1
(
ε
(
1 + 1/
√
n
)
;n, 1−Q
)
− 1
)
log
1−Q
Q
− 1
2
log n− log 1
ε
,
where F−1( · ;n, p) is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution, i.e. F (k;n, p) :=∑k
ℓ=0
(
n
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)n−ℓ and F−1(ε;n, p) := max{k ∈ N |F (k;n, p) ≤ ε}.
Proof. We repeat Eq. (14), where we found
log |M| ≥ − sup
{
R ∈ R
∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
[
n∑
i=1
log
PXX′(Xi,X
′
i)
UX′(X
′
i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Zi
≤ R
]
≤ ε+ δ
}
+ log δ .
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for any 0 < δ < 1− ε. Here, we further used that PX′ is uniform so that the random variables Zi are of the simple
form
Pr
P
[
Zi = logQ
]
= Q and Pr
P
[
Zi = log(1−Q)
]
= 1−Q .
When Q 6= 12 , we can rescale this into a Bernoulli trial:
Bi =
(
Zi − logQ
)(
log
1−Q
Q
)−1
.
Thus, by an appropriate change of variable, we get
log|M | ≥
≥ −
(
n logQ+ log
1−Q
Q
· sup
{
k ∈ N
∣∣∣∣ Pr
[ n∑
i=1
Bi ≤ k
]
≤ ε+ δ
})
+ log δ
= nh(Q)
+
(
n(1−Q)−max
{
k ∈ N
∣∣∣F (k − 1;n, 1 −Q) ≤ ε+ δ}) log 1−Q
Q
+ log δ (16)
= nh(Q) +
(
min
{
k ∈ N
∣∣∣F (k;n,Q) ≥ 1− ε− δ}− nQ) log 1−Q
Q
+ log δ.
The remaining optimizations over k and δ can be done numerically. Alternatively, we are free to choose δ = ε√
n
in Eq. (16) to conclude the proof.
E. Proof of Corollary 3
In order to prove Corollary 3, we just need to evaluate the conditional entropy and entropy variances for the binary-
Gaussian distribution Eq. (7). For the sake of completeness, we do the explicit calculations. For the conditional
entropy we obtain,
H(X|Y )f = −
∫ ∞
−∞
dy
∑
x∈{−1,1}
fXY (x, y)
(
log
fXY (x, y)
fY (y)
)
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
dy
∑
x∈{−1,1}
fXY (x, y) (log fXY (x, y))
+
∫ ∞
−∞
dyfY (y) log (fY (y)) (17)
Let us expand separately the first term in Eq. (17):∫ ∞
−∞
dy
∑
x∈{−1,1}
fXY (x, y) (log fXY (x, y))
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈{−1,1}
dy
1√
8πσ2
exp
(
−(x− y)
2
2σ2
)(
log
1√
8πσ2
exp
(
−(x− y)
2
2σ2
))
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈{−1,1}
dy
1√
8πσ2
exp
(
−(x− y)
2
2σ2
)(
−1
2
log 8πσ2 − (x− y)
2
2σ2
log e
)
= −1
2
log 8πσ2 − log e
2σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈{−1,1}
dy
1√
8πσ2
exp
(
−(x− y)
2
2σ2
)
(x− y)2
= −1
2
log 8πσ2 − log e
2σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
dy
1√
2πσ2
exp
(
− y
2
2σ2
)
y2
= −1
2
log 8πσ2e (18)
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The marginal on Y can be found to be:
fY (y) =
∑
x∈{−1,1}
fXY (x, y)
=
1√
8πσ2
(
exp
(
−(y + 1)
2
2σ2
)
+ exp
(
−(y − 1)
2
2σ2
))
(19)
It follows that H(X|Y )f = h(σ) by plugging Eq. (18) and Eq. (19) back into Eq. (17).
Now let us prove that the conditional entropy variance is given by Eq. (9).
V (X|Y )f : = Var
[
− log fXY
fY
]
= E
[(
− log fXY
fY
)2]
−
(
E
[
− log fXY
fY
])2
= E
[(
− log fXY
fY
)2]
− (h(σ))2 (20)
We conclude by identifying the first term in the right hand side of Eq. (20) with e(σ):
E
[(
− log fXY
fY
)2]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dy
∑
x∈{−1,1}
fXY (x, y)
(
− log fXY (x, y)
fY (y)
)2
= 2
∫ ∞
−∞
dyfXY (1, y)
(
− log fXY (1, y)
fY (y)
)2
where the last equality follows because fXY (1, y) = fXY (−1,−y).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
As shown above, log |M| ≈ ξ(n, ε; · )nh( · ) is theoretically achievable for both binary-binary and binary-
Gaussian distributions, and optimal up to additive constants. However, this implies that, for instance in the binary-
binary case, the approximation log |M| ≈ 1.1nh(Q) is provably too optimistic if ξ(n, ε;Q) > 1.1, e.g. for n ≤ 104,
Q ≥ 2.5%, and ε = 10−2. The function ξ( · , ε;Q) is plotted in Fig. 1 for different values of ε and Q.
Moreover, theoretical achievability only ensures the existence of an information reconciliation (error correcting)
code without actually constructing it. In fact, it is not known if efficient codes used in practical implementations
can achieve the above bound. Hence, the approximation given in Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 are generally too
optimistic and must be checked against what can be achieved using state-of-the-art codes.
We suggest that practical information reconciliation codes for finite block lengths should be benchmarked against
the fundamental limit for that block length, and not against the asymptotic limit. Moreover, we conjecture that, for
some constants ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 1 depending only on the coding scheme used, the leaked information due to information
reconciliation can be approximated well by
leakEC ≈ ξ1 · nh(Q) + ξ2 ·
√
nv(Q) Φ−1(1− ε) (21)
for a large range of n and Q (σ for binary-Gaussian distributions) as long as ε is small enough. Here, ξ1 measures
how well the code achieves the asymptotic limit (1st order) whereas ξ2 measures the 2nd order deficiency.
In the following we test this conjecture against some state-of-the-art error correcting codes (designed for the
binary symmetric and additive white Gaussian channels, BSC and AWGN, respectively). More precisely, we study
several scenarios where we fix two of the parameters in (21) —the failure probability ε, the block length n, the
leakage and the noise parameter— and explore the tradeoff between the two free parameters. In each secenario, we
construct codes that verify the two fixed parameters and fit ξ1 and ξ2 according to (21). For this numerical analysis
we have chosen low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes following several recent implementations [26], [30], [48].
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Fig. 3. Simulated block error rates ε of LDPC codes of length n = 103 and n = 104 and code rates R = 0.6, R = 0.7 and R = 0.8 as a
function of quantum bit error rate Q.
We constructed two sets of LDPC codes with the progressive edge algorithm (PEG) [18]. We constructed the
first set of codes using the following degree polynomials for the BSC:
λ1(x) = 0.1560x + 0.3482x
2 + 0.1594x13 + 0.3364x14
λ2(x) = 0.1305x + 0.2892x
2 + 0.1196x10 + 0.1837x12 + 0.2770x14
λ3(x) = 0.1209x + 0.2738x
2 + 0.1151x5 + 0.2611x10 + 0.2291x14
where λ1(x), λ2(x) and λ3(x) were designed for coding rates 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8, respectively [8].
And we constructed the second set of codes using these polynomials for the AWGN channel:
λ4(x) = 0.16988x + 0.29342x
2 + 0.1633x6 + 0.15835x11 + 0.21505x28
λ5(x) = 0.13372x + 0.2689x
2 + 0.00358x6 + 0.15093x7 + 0.01572x8
+ 0.04647x9 + 0.0001x10 + 0.00228x19 + 0.08615x24 + 0.02173x25
+ 0.27025x27 + 0.00017x29
λ6(x) = 0.10462x + 0.31534x
2 + 0.26969x8 + 0.00933x19 + 0.02778x21
+ 0.00803x24 + 0.23115x26 + 0.03406x29
with code rates 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8, for λ4(x), λ5(x) and λ6(x), respectively.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the block error rate as a function of Q (the crossover probability in BSC) and SNR= 1/σ2
(the signal to noise ratio in the AWGN) for codes with rates 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and lengths 103, 104. The thick lines
connect the simulated points while the dotted lines represent a fit following Eq. (21) (the fit values can be found in
Table I). The fit perfectly reproduces the so-called waterfall region of the codes. However, Eq. (21) drops sharply
with Q for Q ∈ [0, 0.1] and with σ for σ ∈ [0, 4] while LDPC codes experience an error floor. In this second region
the fit can not approximate the behavior of the codes.
In Fig. 1 we plot the function ξ(n, ε;Q) and the efficiency results obtained with LDPC codes for reconciling
strings following a binary-binary distribution. We chose as representative lengths 103, 104, 105, and 106. For every
block length we constructed codes of rates 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8 following λ1(x), λ2(x), and λ3(x). The points in the
figure were obtained by puncturing and shortening the original codes [11], [12] until the desired block error rate
was obtained. The results show an extra inefficiency due to the use of real codes. This inefficiency shares strong
similarities with the converse bound, its separation from the asymptotic value is greater for lower values of Q,
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Fig. 4. Simulated block error rates ε of LDPC codes of length n = 103 and n = 104 and code rates R = 0.6, R = 0.7 and R = 0.8 as a
function of SNR.
block error rates and lengths and fades as these parameters increase. For example, for n = 104, Q = 1.0% and
ε = 10−2 the extra inefficiency due to the use of real codes is over 1.2 while for n = 106, Q = 5.0% and ε = 10−1
the extra inefficiency is close to 1.05.
Similarly, in Fig. 2 we plot ξ(n, ε;σ) and the efficiency obtained with LDPC codes when reconciling strings
following binary-Gaussian distributions. Representative lengths were also chosen 103, 104, and 105. Codes of rates
0.6, 0.7, and 0.8, following λ5(x), λ6(x) and λ7(x), respectively, were punctured until the desired block error rate
was obtained (ε = 10−1). As in Fig. 1, the results show an additional inefficiency due to the use of real codes.
Finally, we address the design question posed above, that is, we study the efficiency variation as a function of
the block error rate for fixed n and noise parameter. We have performed this study only for the binary-binary
distribution for computational reasons, but we expect similar results to hold for the binary-Gaussian. In this setting
we need code constructions that allow to modulate the rate with fixed block-length. The most natural modulating
option would have been to construct codes for every n of interest and augment [28] the codes, that is, eliminate
some of the restrictions that the codewords verify. However, it is known that LDPC codes do not perform well
under this rate adaptation technique [47]. In consequence, we constructed a different code with the PEG algorithm
for every rate. In order to obtain a smooth efficiency curve we used the degree polynomials λ1(x), λ2(x) and λ3(x)
for constructing all codes even with coding rates different to the design rate.
Fig. 5 shows the efficiency as a function of the block error rate. Each of the two subfigures (a) and (b) show the
simulation results for codes of length 103 and 104, respectively. Colours blue and red correspond to Q = 1.5% and
3.0% in subfigure (a) and to 2.5% and 4.0% in subfigure (b). The solid lines show the bound given by Corollary 2,
similar to Fig. 1 we observe that, ceteris paribus, lower values of Q imply higher values of ξ. The points show
values achieved by LDPC codes: each point represents the block error rate of a different parity check modulated
code. Finally the dotted lines show the best least squares fit to Eq. 21, the values of ξ1 and ξ2 can be found in
Table I. From these curves we can extract some useful design information, 1) if the target failure probability is
very high [26] then the gain obtained by increasing the block length is modest, 2) if the target failure probability
is low (below 10−4) the leakage is over a fifty percent larger than the optimal one for moderate block lengths and
3) for block-length 105, the largest length for which we could compute simulations in the whole block error rate
region, we were unable to consistently offer efficiency values below 1.1 and furthermore we report no point with
f below 1.05.
Tables I and II show the values of ξ1 and ξ2 used in Fig. 1, Fig. 3, Fig. 5 and Fig. 2, Fig. 4 respectively to fit
the data points obtained from the simulations. In these curves ξ1 is —independently of ε, n, Q, σ— in the range
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Fig. 5. Ratio between the leakage and the asymptotical optimum in several scenarios as a function of the block error rate ε. Subfigures (a)
and (b) show results for block lengths 103 and 104, respectively. In each subfigure the solid lines show the converse bound from Corollary 2
while the dotted lines show the values achieved with actual LDPC codes.
[1.05, 1.16] while the 2nd order deficiency ξ2 is more sensible to the parameter variations. In the first four rows
of Table I, that correspond to Fig. 1 with fixed Q and ε, ξ2 is in the range [2.41, 3.82], for the middle six rows,
that correspond to Fig. 3 with fixed n and leak, ξ2 is in the range [1.49, 1.96], while for the last four rows, that
correspond to Fig. 5 with fixed n and Q, ξ2 is in the range [1.26, 1.58]. In the first three rows of Table II, that
correspond to Fig. 2 with fixed σ and ε, ξ2 is in the range [2.58, 2.71], while in the last six rows, that correspond
to Fig. 4 with fixed n and leak, ξ2 is in the range [1.07, 1.42]. Note that for each scenario, the averages in these
ranges could safely be used for system design purposes since necessarily codes with those ξ1 and ξ2 values or
better exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied the fundamental limits for one-way information reconciliation in the finite key regime.
These limits imply that a commonly used approximation for the information leakage during information reconcil-
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n Q ε leak ξ1 ξ2
- 0.010 10−2 - 1.13 3.82
- 0.025 10−2 - 1.07 3.71
- 0.050 10−2 - 1.06 3.54
- 0.050 10−1 - 1.05 2.41
103 - - 4 · 102 1.11 1.39
103 - - 3 · 102 1.12 1.45
103 - - 2 · 102 1.13 1.69
104 - - 4 · 103 1.07 1.41
104 - - 3 · 103 1.08 1.44
104 - - 2 · 103 1.11 1.89
103 0.015 - - 1.16 1.52
103 0.030 - - 1.16 1.31
104 0.025 - - 1.14 1.26
104 0.040 - - 1.07 1.58
TABLE I
VALUES OF ξ1 AND ξ2 FOR THE FITTED CURVES IN FIG. 1, FIG. 3 AND FIG. 5.
n SNR ε leak ξ1 ξ2
- 1.6 10−1 - 1.07 2.58
- 2.1 10−1 - 1.06 2.67
- 2.8 10−1 - 1.06 2.74
103 - - 4 · 102 1.11 1.23
103 - - 3 · 102 1.12 1.34
103 - - 2 · 102 1.13 1.40
104 - - 4 · 103 1.08 1.27
104 - - 3 · 103 1.07 1.42
104 - - 2 · 103 1.08 1.33
TABLE II
VALUES OF ξ1 AND ξ2 FOR THE FITTED CURVES IN FIG. 2 AND FIG. 4.
iation is too optimistic for a range of error rates and block-lengths. We proposed a two-parameter approximation
that takes into account finite key effects.
We compared the finite length limits with LDPC codes and found a consistent range of achievable finite-length
efficiencies. These efficiencies should be of use to the quantum key distribution systems designer. One question
that we leave open is the study of these values for different coding families.
Finally, it is clear that PE and PA also contribute to finite-length losses in the QKD key rate. While it seems
possible to investigate fundamental limits in PA based on the normal approximation of randomness extraction
against quantum side information [41] as a separate problem, we would in fact need to investigate it jointly with
IR since there is generally a trade-off between the two tasks that needs to be optimized over.
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